The service can create, list, modify and delete roles or service principals, which are identities that applications and services use to access resources without a human user.
IAM Roles and Service Principals
CCC.IAM.CP06
Related Threats
| ID | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|
| CCC.IAM.TH02 | Overly-Permissive IAM Policy | An access control policy attached to an identity or a resource is configured with excessive permissions, violating the principle of least privilege. This can enable unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, or other unintended actions by principals whose credentials might be compromised or who are acting erroneously. |
| CCC.IAM.TH03 | Overly-Permissive Identity Trust Policy | An IAM role or service principal's trust policy is configured to allow principals from untrusted or overly broad scopes, such as any identity in any account, to assume or impersonate it. This can allow an external or unauthorized identity to gain access to the cloud environment, completely bypassing internal identity controls. |
| CCC.IAM.TH05 | Roles are Created Without Authorization | A principal holds permissions to create roles or service identities beyond what its function requires, or a compromised identity holds such permissions. Additional roles are then created outside the organization's provisioning process, each with its own trust policy and permissions, and remain available after the originating access ends. This compromises the integrity of the access model and the confidentiality of the resources those roles can reach. |
| CCC.IAM.TH06 | IAM Policies are Modified Without Authorization | A principal holds permissions to create, update or attach IAM policies beyond what its function requires, or a compromised identity holds such permissions. Policies are then modified outside the organization's change process so that identities gain permissions they were not granted by design, and the change persists until it is detected. This compromises the integrity of the access model and the confidentiality and integrity of the resources the widened permissions reach. |
| CCC.IAM.TH08 | Privilege Escalation via Indirect Role Usage | An identity principal possesses specific, highly privileged permissions, such as the ability to pass roles or impersonate service accounts, that allow it to leverage the permissions of a different, more privileged role. Even without being able to directly assume the target role, the principal can attach it to a new resource they control and then use that resource to perform unauthorized actions. |
| CCC.IAM.TH11 | Unused Credentials Remain Active | Unused IAM identity that is no longer needed or monitored remains active. Its compromise is less likely to be detected, and it represents a persistent, unnecessary attack surface. |
| CCC.IAM.TH12 | IAM Role is Coerced into Unauthorized Cross-Account Actions (Confused Deputy) | An external actor tricks a legitimate, authorized third-party application into making requests to the cloud environment. A role in the cloud account (the "deputy"), which trusts that third-party application, then performs unauthorized actions on behalf of the actor. |